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Abstract: It has been frequently asserted that the western Roman supreme com-
mander Stilicho’s neglect of the Transalpine provinces during the usurpation of
Constantine III contributed to his eventual downfall in 408. Stilicho’s fatal flaw,
in this recurring opinion, seems to have been a desire to annex eastern Illyricum
for which he sought to employ Alaric. In a volte-face, he then wished to use Alaric
as the leader of the western field army that was supposed to bring down Con-
stantine. The aim of this article is to advance several notes of critique on this
narrative that has had a long life in Stilichonian scholarship. Instead it will
demonstrate that a) the threat of Constantine has been overestimated, b) Stilicho
had no designs on annexing eastern Illyricum, c) he had a military strategy ready
against Constantine that was sound and in tandem with earlier civil wars, and d)
that the intended role of Alaric during this enterprise has been misunderstood.
Nevertheless, Stilicho’s military strategy in 408 proved to be fundamentally
corrosive towards his hitherto carefully built-up political capital. Olympius, the
architect of his demise and his precise knowledge of Stilicho’s army preparations,
as befitted the magister officiorium, provided the former with the perfect material
to fabricate stories of Stilicho coveting a throne while neglecting the west. This set
in motion the plot that ultimately brought down Stilicho.
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I The aftermath of the Radagaisan War and the
British usurpations
Before Constantine was hailed emperor by the British field army and crossed over
to the continent in 407, Stilicho had achieved the greatest military victory of his
career.1 During the summer of 406 he had brought down in Italy several large
barbarian armies united under the leadership of the Gothic rex Radagaisus.2 As a
result, the western Roman army was reinforced with thousands of former barbar-
ian followers, while so many others were enslaved and auctioned off that the
market allegedly crashed.3 Nevertheless, this victory came at a price. That the
impact of Radagaisus’ invasion was as dire as some of the most alarming sources
report seems confirmed by various factors. Radagaisus’ army had ravaged Italy
from the Alps to Tuscany for more than half a year before Stilicho had finally
mustered a force large enough to tackle the main barbarian force. The fact that he
even took some northern Italic cities by storm, though unspecified but most
probably all walled, was ominous enough in its own right.4 More portentous was
the fact that not all of Radagaisus’ war-bands had been vanquished and several
of these crossed over the Alps and eventually helped trigger both the crossing of
the Rhine-frontier by Alans, Vandals and Sueves in 406/407, and a state of panic
in Gaul.5 It is against the backdrop of this mayhem that we need to consider
Constantine’s usurpation.
In contrast to most of the third century, when the island was generally
quiescent, from the Tetrarchy to the Theodosian dynasty Britain proved to be a
province with a particular penchant for political uprisings. One reason for this
was Britain’s remoteness from imperial centres of patronage, especially when
emperors were not residing in Trier. No emperor visited Britain again after
Constans I in early 343, meaning there was less opportunity for regional elites to
1 On Stilicho, see PLRE 1: “Stilicho,” 853–858. Mazzarino (1942); Cameron (1970); Matthews
(1975), 253–283; O’Flynn (1983), 14–62; Janssen (2004); McEvoy (2013), 1141–1186. For general
studies on western Roman history in this particular era, see Stein (1968); Heather (2005); Halsall
(2007); Börm (2013); Lee (2013a).
2 Addit. ad Prosp. Haun. (marg.) s.a. 405; Oros. 7.37.4; Zos. 5.26.3. Paulin. V. Amb. 10.50; Addit.
ad Prosp. Haun. (marg.) s.a. 406. On the war against Radagaisus, see nowWijnendaele (2016a).
3 Barbarian auxiliaries: Olympiod. Fr. 9 (ed. Blockley 1983) and discussed later. Barbarian slaves:
Oros. 7.36.16.
4 Chron. Gall. 452, 52.
5 Wijnendaele (2016a), 276–278 with discussion of the sources.
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accumulate wealth and status through imperial benefactions.6 In the long run this
proved to be a recipe for discontent. Ambitious men who had grand designs on
imperial power usually found British troops willing to throw their weight behind
their candidature. Thus, the island formed a bastion for the usurpations of
Carausius (286), Allectus (293), Constantine I (306) and Magnus Maximus (383),
and unswervingly joined usurpations launched from Gaul, such as those of
Magnentius (350), Julian (360), and Eugenius (392).7 Indeed, one contemporary
author refers to Britain specifically as a “province rich in usurpers” (Britannia
fertilis provincia tyrannorum).8 In 406, twelve years after the defeat of Eugenius,
no less than three British usurpers were at a fast pace promoted and demoted
depending on the whim of the army that raised them, until Constantine III became
their final choice.9
Constantine crossed the Channel during the spring of 407, but the limits of
his military power were apparent from the very beginning. He was not able to
defeat the Alans, Vandals and Sueves in pitched battle, but rather struck treaties
with them.10 What we see here is the long shadow cast by the horrendous defeat
of the western Roman army at the Frigidus in 394: in the decade that followed
western forces were constantly required to juggle one challenge after the other,
especially in Italy and the Balkans, without having the proper time to re-build
themselves to full strength. Consequentially, both Britain and Gaul had to transfer
some of their standing units to Italy when it was faced with significant challenges
to domestic security, such as Alaric’s first intrusion at the beginning of the
century (Claud. de bello Get. 448). The field army that Constantine III took to Gaul
will have been a pale shade of the former army that had propped up his namesake
a century earlier. This becomes most apparent during Constantine’s advance on
the continent.
6 Visit of Constans I: Lib.Or. 59.137; Amm. 20.1.1. If one were pedantic, one could remark that the
eastern Roman emperor Manuel II Palaiologos visited England during the winter of 1400/1401,
though naturally this emperor had hardly any control over territory in mainland Europe, let alone
the British isle.
7 Some of these have been better studied than others; for the specific British background in every
case, see Birley (2005), 371–460.
8 Hier. Ep. 133.9. Zos. 4.35.3 also describes the army of Britain dominated by “insolence and
irascibility” (αὐθαδεíᾳ καì θυμῷ).
9 PLRE 2: “Fl. Claudius Constantinus 21,” 316–317; “Gratianus 3,” 518–519; “Marcus 2,” 719–720.
For Constantine’s reign, see Drinkwater (1998); Kulikowski (2000), 332–341.
10 Zos 6.3.1–2 has sometimes been read as referring to a victory of Constantine III’s forces over
these barbarians, but see the criticisms of Paschoud (1989), 28–30, Birley (2005), 458–459 and
Wijnendaele (2016a), 276–278 that Zosimus most likely equivocated this with a victory by Stilicho
over one of Radagaisus’ armies.
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A dynastic campaign under the command of Stilicho’s lieutenant Sarus
defeated one of the usurper’s field armies in open battle and even managed to
besiege Constantine himself in Valence (Zos. 6.2.3–6). Only the timely arrival of a
relief-force hastily levied from Alamannic and Frankish allies ensured that Con-
stantine’s regime was not destroyed branch and root before it had barely started,
and Sarus retreated with his forces to Italy (Zos. 6.2.6). This was what a single,
central Roman field army could accomplish. Hence Stilicho was not entirely
displeased with his Gothic lieutenant’s conduct, and Sarus still held a senior post
at Ravenna in 408.11 Similarly, when Constantine tried to seize the Iberian penin-
sula in 408, his field army suffered a defeat at the hands of a motley crew of local
soldiers, servants and retainers raised by members of the Theodosian family.12
Although Stilicho ought to have had far greater military resources at his disposal
than did Constantine, the assembly and preparation of a field army for a major
campaign necessarily took time.13 However, he was ready by 408 to launch a new
campaign against Constantine from Ticinum. While it is difficult to assess the
combined strength of these forces, some estimates are possible. Stilicho had
drawn on 30 numeri for his final assault on Radagaisus, a force plausibly
estimated between 10,000 and 15,000 men.14 After the latter’s defeat, he subse-
quently incorporated about 12,000 of his best warriors into his army, meaning
Stilicho may have had as many as 25,000 men or more at his disposal in 408. The
fact that he did not issue legislation to organize emergency conscription, as had
been necessary during the Gildonian crisis or the war against Radagaisus, con-
firms that he felt that he already had a sufficiently large force.15
II Alaric and Illyricum
During the period 407–408, Stilicho created a stir by pursuing a policy aimed at
trying to win the service of Alaric and his Goths for the western empire, rather
than crush them as the potentially dangerous enemies that many of his opponents
11 PLRE 2: “Sarus,” 978.
12 Soz. 9.11.4–9.12.1; Oros.Hist. 7.40.6–8.
13 Burns (1994), 212–213 realistically estimates the British comitatenses at roughly 5,000 men
during Constantine III’s bid for power. Modéran (2014), 64–72 also presents a useful survey of
residual imperial forces in Gaul at the time of the Rhine frontier’s collapse, and Constantine III’s
struggles in salvaging the situation.
14 Wijnendaele (2016a), 270–271 n. 20.
15 Gildo: CTh 7.13.12; Radagaisus: CTh. 7.13.16.
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feared they were.16 In particular, it has been argued, from hostile eastern sources,
that he tried to use them as his agents in an attempt to annex eastern Illyricum.17
The rationale for this annexation, it is claimed, is that it would have provided him
with a new source of recruits and taxes.18 However, there are several objections to
this interpretation. First, Illyricum was an unlikely cornucopia of either recruits or
taxes because of the incessant battering which it had suffered during the last
quarter of the fourth century, first, during the Gothic wars under Valens and
Theodosius I (377–382), then during the civil wars between the latter and the
western usurpers Magnus Maximus and Eugenius (388/394), and, finally, during
the cold war between Arcadius’ and Honorius’ courts, which had allowed Alaric
to install himself in the region (395–397).19 Indeed, the Church Father Jerome
summarized the sorry state of the Illyrian provinces poignantly in a letter written
ca. 396:
“For twenty years and more the blood of Romans has every day been shed between
Constantinople and the Julian Alps. Scythia, Thrace, Macedonia, Thessaly, Dardania, Dacia,
Epirus, Dalmatia, and all the provinces of Pannonia, have been sacked, pillaged and
plundered by Goths, Sarmatians, Quadi, Alans, Huns, Vandals and Marcomanni.”
viginti et eo amplius anni sunt, quod inter Constantinopolin et Alpes lulias cotidie Romanus
sanguis effunditur. Scythiam, Thraciam, Macedoniam, Thessaliam, Dardaniam, Daciam,
Epiros, Dalmatiam, cunctasque Pannonias Gothus, Sarmata, Quadus, Alanus, Huni, Vandali,
Marcomanni vastant, trahunt, rapiunt.20
Next, the defeat of Radagaisus had already provided Stilicho with a sudden large
new pool of recruits, as mentioned previously, so that there was no immediate
16 For reasons of intellectually honesty, I wish to point out that my reading of Alaric and his
Goths’ modus operandi is very much a “military” one (as e. g. Liebeschuetz 1990; Halsall 2007;
Delaplace 2015), rather than a “moving peoples” one (as e. g. Heather 1991; Demandt 1998). For a
new position in this debate to see Alaric as the champion of an “interest group,” see now Gheller
(2017).
17 Soz. 9.4.2–4. Demougeot (1950); Jones (1964), 184–185; Matthews (1975), 279; Wolfram (1988),
153; Paschoud (1989), 217; Liebeschuetz (1990), 66–67; Wolfram (1997), 97; Blockley (1998), 121;
Drinkwater (1998), 271; Janssen (2004), 215–220; Amidon (2007), 154 n. 7; Halsall (2007), 209;
McEvoy (2013), 176; Van Nuffelen (2013), 143; Delaplace (2015), 123–124; Dunn (2015), 385;Mitchell
(2015), 99. See also, however, the reservations of Kulikowski (2007), 171.
18 Blockley (1998), 121; Heather (2005), 219–220; Börm (2013), 49.
19 Liebeschuetz (1990), 67 also remarked that “[t]here certainly is no evidence that [Stilicho]
regarded the Balkans as an indispensable recruiting area.”
20 Hier. Ep. 60.16 (tr. Wright 1933, slightly emended). Naturally, one should not accept Jerome’s
rhetoric prima facie and the archaeological record certainly does not match his picture of an
Illyrian wasteland. That being said, it certainly echoes the troubles that had been plaguing this
region over the previous two decades.
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need for any additional manpower in 407. Finally, the strongest argument against
an attempted western annexation of eastern Illyricum using Alaric is the fact that
Constantinople does not seem to have noticed this, because it maintained good
diplomatic relations with Ravenna throughout 407 and 408, as indicated by the
fact that the two courts continued to recognize each other’s consuls during these
years.21 This is crucial contemporary evidence that has usually been neglected in
favour of literary sources drawn up after the events. Yet recognition or the with-
holding of recognition of consular candidates is a sound criterion for how imper-
ial policies of one court were perceived by its twin et vice versa.22
So what were Stilicho’s intentions for Alaric and his Goths? Alaric marched
from eastern Illyricum into Noricum with his Gothic army in 407, and Zosimus
(5.29.5) interprets this as a hostile incursion, even claiming that Alaric was paid
by Stilicho for “his invasion of Italy and Noricum” (Ἰταλíαν καì τò Νωρικòν
εἰσβολῆς). However, it is nonsensical to claim that Stilicho paid Alaric to attack
Noricum and Italy on his behalf.23 A more probable explanation is that Stilicho
had requested Alaric to move through this region as the first stage of a journey to
the West in order to assist against the usurper Constantine III.24 Alaric will have
halted near Emona for supplies, and have then sent word to Stilicho in Ravenna
while also bringing up the need to pay his troops. After having received no
payment for more than a year, Alaric could reasonably demand gold for his
soldiers.25 Indeed, Zosimus nowhere states that Alaric threatened war, only that
21 CLRE 348–351.
22 Eastern factions had once succeeded in proclaiming Stilicho as hostis rei publicae after his
meddling in Balkan affairs and own retaliation against themagister utriusque militiae per Africam
Gildo who had transferred his allegiance to Arcadius (Zos. 5.11.1). In return, the western court
refused to recognize Eutropius’ consulship in 399 (CLRE 333). Further notorious examples are
Valentinian III’s refusal to recognize the eastern consulship of Marcian in 451 (CLRE 436), whom
he clearly regarded as an illegitimate upstart. Similarly, the eastern court refused to recognize the
western consulships of Majorian in 458 (CLRE 451), Ricimer in 459 (CLRE 453), Severus in 462
(CLRE 459) and Basilius in 463 (CLRE 461). It should be stressed that we hear of not a single, not
even symbolic, punitive measure undertaken by the eastern court against Stilicho’s regime
throughout 407 or 408.
23 Mitchell (2015), 99 takes Zosimus at face value when he claims that Alaric and his men
“returnedwestwards, attacking north-eastern Italy and the province of Noricum.”
24 Burns (1994), 215 rightly observes that Noricum still lay within the Illyrian diocese and that
Alaric thus remained within his originally assigned command sphere. However, one cannot rule
out that Alaric and his followers may have travelled westwards independently from any agree-
ment with Stilicho: see Gheller (2017), 67–68 no. 68, 179–180.
25 Olympiod. Fr. 7.2; Zos. 5.29.6–9. Wolfram (1988), 154 ff. and Liebeschuetz (1990), 67 remark
that 4000 lb of gold (roughly 288,000 solidi) was a substantial sum, perhaps enough to employ
72,000 soldiers for a year. Liebeschuetz especially regarded this as evidence that Alaric and his
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he asked money for his stay in Illyricum and move to Noricum. The problem here,
however, was that state funds had sunk abysmally low and Stilicho needed the
support of the Senate in Rome in order to raise the funds to pay Alaric. Unsurpris-
ingly, the senators were unwilling to do what was necessary to raise these funds,
not least because this would have impacted their own wealth also. Furthermore,
many were probably genuinely concerned that Alaric could not be trusted and
would turn against them again given the slightest opportunity. Nevertheless,
Stilicho was voted the necessary funds.
III The counter-strike against Constantine III
Scholars have often argued that Alaric was then supposed to lead the campaign
against Constantine III, supported by an imperial army already gathering at
Ticinum, while Stilicho would embark on his journey to Constantinople.26 On
1 May, 408, the eastern emperor Arcadius had died and Stilicho pounced upon
the opportunity to meddle in the succession.27 Yet while it may well have been
Stilicho’s intention to use Alaric and his Goths to spearhead the campaign against
Constantine, this does not necessarily mean that Alaric would have been supreme
commander also. Here one notes that Zosimus (5.31.5) merely states that Alaric
and part of his army was to be sent to Gaul “together with Roman forces and their
officers to share the war with him” (τῶν τε σὺν αὐτῷ βαρβάρων ἄγοντα μέρος καì
τέλη Ῥωμαΐκὰ καὶ ἡγεμόνας; my emphasis). The focus is naturally on Alaric here,
men “were bargaining just like mercenaries enrolled for a specified campaign.” However, this
does not take into account that Alaric will have expected a significant part of this money to serve
as his personal salary for his role as imperial commander. Even today, the regular remuneration
for the highest military commands (such as the comites rei militares or magistri militum) remains
unknown. Lee (2013a), 99 points out that it must have been substantial, however, given the
eagerness other non-Roman leaders pursued it with. The case of Attila may point in this direction.
In the late 440 s Theodosius II’s government was forced to pay the Hun monarch an annual
indemnity of more than 2000 lb of gold, but this was sent as his “salary” for his nominal rank as
Roman general (Priscus Fr. 11.2). On this episode, see nowMeier (2015). For a discussion of the use
of honours and gifts towards barbarian leaders under Theodosius I, see Gheller (2017), 62–63;
142–152. Alternatively, Janssen (2004), 219 suggests that Alaric could have asked for one year of
back pay and an advance for the next year, on the calculation of 12 solidi per soldier for 12,000
men. While it is impossible to reconstruct Alaric’s entire fighting strength in the half decade
between his retreat from Italy and Stilicho’s downfall, this may be a plausible estimate.
26 Bury (1923), 171; O’Flynn (1983), 56; Wolfram (1988), 154; Liebeschuetz (1990), 67; Williams
and Friell (1994), 137;Wolfram (1997), 97; Drinkwater (1998), 281; Halsall (2007), 213.
27 For Stilicho’s plans regarding Arcadius’ succession, seeWijnendaele (forthcoming a).
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because he was the main subject of the conversation, and that is all. It is not at all
clear that he was to be supreme commander. On the contrary, the presence at
Ticinum of the magister militum per Gallias Chariobaudes, the magister equitum
praesentalis Vincentius, and the comes domesticorum Salvius suggests other-
wise.28 These were the three most senior commanders of the western Roman army
after Stilicho, and the obvious suggestion is that they were there to keep Alaric in
check. At best, Alaric was meant to be a partner, not the overall commander,
perhaps serving as vicarius ormagister militum vacans to Vincentius.29
Strategically this was a sound plan: Alaric’s forces could attack Constantine’s
forces through Raetia and Gaul, while Honorius’ relatives were already harassing
the usurper’s rear forces in Spain (Zos. 6.4). Vincentius’ army could then provide
the main thrust through the Alps and complete the pincer movement. Precedents
in previous late Roman civil wars suggest that such tactics could be devastatingly
effective. After the bloody battle of Mursa in 351, Constantius II had encouraged
Alamanni to harass his rival Magnentius’ brother and co-emperor Decentius
across the Rhine, while his main force crossed the Cottian Alps and delivered the
killing blow at Mons Seleucus.30 Similarly, Julian pursued a multi-pronged strat-
egy during his civil war with Constantius II, having his magister equitum Nevitta
moving an army from Gaul through Raetia, while another army crossed the Alps
into Italy (Amm. Marc. 21.8). Just like the war against Radagaisus, Stilicho could
let two subordinate armies launch the first attacks on the enemy in order to wear
him down before letting the imperial army finish the job.31
Yet Stilicho’s insistence that the Senate pay Alaric’s expenses, that the Gothic
general would be allowed to participate in the war against Constantine so close to
Italy, and that he involve himself eastern affairs, probably filled the western
civilian aristocracy with deep resentment. While Stilicho’s plans for dealing with
the situation in Gaul probably attracted the most criticism, this does not mean
that his planned eastern adventure enjoyed much more favour. A decade earlier
he had taken a western army into eastern territory and had been proclaimed an
28 Zos 5.32.4. PLRE 1: “Salvius 1,” 800 claims that this comes domesticorum is the same person as
the scutarius who distinguished himself in 368 against the Alamanni. This is not impossible but
unlikely given the vast distance in time, see also Paschoud (1989), 233.
29 Mazzarino (1942), 294 already remarked that the employment of Alaric against Constantine III
would not have been a novelty in the former’s career. After all, he had also fought for the
Theodosian dynasty against the previous western usurper Eugenius at the Frigidus in 394 (Socrat.
7.10; Zos. 5.5.4; Jord.Get. 145).
30 Alamanni attacking Decentius: Amm. Marc. 16.12.5. War on multiple fronts bringing down
Magnentius: Zos. 2.53.3.
31 Wijnendaele (2016a), 279.
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enemy of the state by Constantinople as a consequence (Zos. 5.11.1). A fundamen-
tal difference between his campaign of 397 and that intended for 408 is that the
imperial west had still retained its territorial integrity during the former, while by
408 it had lost almost half of its provinces to a usurper. Stilicho’s Gothic comman-
der Sarus had already failed to eliminate Constantine III, and the palace ministers
may have doubted whether Alaric, another Gothic upstart, could handle the job
either. Furthermore, if Stilicho departed for the east and his adventure misfired,
the court in Italy would be in a precarious position. They could reasonably fear
that another civil war was looming in the Balkans, while that on Italy’s western
flank had still not been settled. Given that the memory of Radagaisus’ invasion
was still fresh in mind, who knew what kind of extra burdens could be heaped
upon Italy’s landed nobility? Finally, one should note that resistance against any
co-operation with Alaric may also help explain a mutiny among imperial soldiers
near Bologna after Stilicho departed from Rome (Zos. 5.31.1–2). Zosimus does not
state the reason for this mutiny, but it may have originated among the men who
were instructed to transport gold to Alaric.32 The idea of paying Alaric, a man
whom many of these soldiers had fought against only six years earlier, may have
aroused anger and indignation—especially if they had also been instructed to
fight alongside him against Constantine thereafter. Stilicho had successfully
managed to antagonise both civilian aristocrats and Roman soldiers, and the
stage had been set for a coup against him.33
IV The plot against Stilicho
The leader of the palatine cabal which engineered Stilicho’s fall was a certain
Olympius, who had been personally introduced to the emperor by Stilicho (Olym-
32 As Burns (1994), 361–362, n. 130 notes, the transport of so much gold from Italy to Noricum
will have required elaborate security. This may be related to the accusation in Philost.HE 12.2 that
Stilicho hadminted coins without authorization, thus committing a “usurpation”(τυραννíδα).
33 Senatorial contempt about paying Alaric during Stilicho’s assembly was already voiced by a
certain Lampadius who decried it as a pactio servitutidis (Zos. 5.29.9). See also Matthews (1975),
277–278 and McEvoy (2013), 179 about senatorial disaffection with Stilicho’s policies and its
financial repercussions on them. Curiously, Blockley (1992), 53 asserts that “the eastern govern-
ment, led by Anthemius, perhaps helped itself by arranging the elimination of Stilicho in the same
year as Arcadius’ death, a development which greatly eased tensions between the two parts of the
Empire”. While eastern support for Honorius’ court did materialize after Stilicho’s downfall, as
most clearly evidenced by the 4,000 soldiers sent by Theodosius II to garrison Ravenna during the
struggle with Alaric (Soz. 9.8), there are no visible traces of Constantinopolitan involvement in his
actual demise.
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piod. Fr. 5.1). As the magister officiorum, one of his office’s responsibilities was to
supply the army through the state’s fabricae, meaning he will have been well
informed about his superior’s journey.34 While Stilicho was planning to travel to
Constantinople with four legions, Olympius started disseminating rumours that
the generalissimo’s real intention was to usurp imperial power for Eucherius.35
Such accusations can easily be dismissed, since such an endeavour would have
run counter to his entire career, and the political image as guardian of the
Theodosian dynasty that he had carefully crafted over thirteen years (as most
conspicuous in the public discourse of his mouthpiece Claudian).36 It would be
outlandish to suppose that Stilicho could have violently installed himself in
Constantinople with a mere 5000 men and this force was clearly meant as a guard
and nothing more.37 Indeed, when Stilicho’s ministers were subsequently tortured
by Olympius’ henchmen, they revealed no knowledge of any desire by Stilicho to
become emperor, and the torturers eventually had to cease their efforts to procure
a confession in this manner (Zos. 5.35.3). Nevertheless, Olympius could have
easily distorted precise knowledge about the Ticinum campaign and Stilicho’s
journey to Constantinople to suggest to a receptive audience—one that had
already come to hate themagister utriusque militiae—that Silicho was hell-bent on
snatching the throne. Hence, when the emperor arrived in Ticinum in order to
address the troops before their despatch against Constantine III, Olympius gave a
quiet signal, and the soldiers suddenly attacked the key ministers and officers
present there.38 They also went on to loot the city.
Stilicho was not present during the massacre at Ticinum, and so escaped
death there. He learned of the massacre while at Bologna, and immediately
assembled the leaders of all his barbarian allies. They seem to have remained
loyal soldiers of the emperor as yet, because they decided not to launch a full-
scale revolt unless the emperor himself had been harmed, but had to focus
instead on the leaders of the mutiny (Zos. 5.33.1). However, Stilicho decided
against any military action even of this limited kind, both because there was a
34 On the military responsibilities of the magister officiorum, see Jones (1964), 368–369; Elton
(1996), 240.
35 Olympiod. Fr. 5.2; Zos. 5.32.1.
36 O’Flynn (1983), 59 rightly remarks that it would have been political suicide for Stilicho to
replace a rightful heir of Theodosius I with his own son.
37 Börm (2013), 49–50 also points out that at this point Honorius was the senior Augustus of the
empire and thus, at least in theory, had a right to establish his pre-eminence over the eastern
course. It made some sense on Stilicho’s behalf that he convinced the western emperor to remain
in Italy, given that the usurper Constantine was still at large in Gaul.
38 Olympiod. Fr. 5.2; Zos. 5.32.3–6.
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real possibility of defeat, given the strength of the Roman forces at the time, and,
perhaps more importantly, because such action risked turning the emperor irre-
vocably against him. Finally, he probably suspected also that certain elements of
his barbarian forces, noticeably Sarus and his men, were simply opportunists
seeking to turn this situation to their own benefit. Sarus confirmed such suspicion
when he suddenly attacked Stilicho’s Hunnic guard, killed them all, and captured
his baggage train.39 Stilicho, realizing that he could not in fact trust all of his
barbarian allies, sent orders to the cities instructing them to shut their gates to his
men. He then proceeded to Ravenna, where he was soon arrested and brought to
execution on 22 August, 408.40
The manner in which Stilicho allowed himself to be arrested and executed
demonstrates that, despite his extraordinary power, he was still a product of the
traditional fourth-century military hierarchy.41 He fled to a church for sanctuary,
while his allies and servants armed themselves in case they were needed. Soldiers
retrieved him from the church, and even when it became clear that their instruc-
tions had changed, and that they now intended to execute Stilicho rather than
simply arrest him, Stilicho still forbade his supporters to intervene and quietly
accepted his fate (Zos. 5.34.3–5). In effect, he delayed any open revolt until it was
too late. He placed a quiet loyalty in the emperor, hoping that he would even-
tually realize the truth of the matter, a hope which proved totally misplaced.
Finally, at that point where even Stilicho probably realized that he was not going
to escape with his life, it was too late, and his main concern then had to be what
would happen to his family after him, particularly his son who was present there
with him in Ravenna. Unfortunately for him, however, his quiet surrender to his
fate did nothing to save his son.42
The same court faction who had engineered Stilicho’s downfall seems to have
organized a massacre of his barbarian supporters also (Zos. 5.35.5–6). Yet these
pogroms cannot be conceived as purely anti-barbarian reprisals.43 It is true that
thousands of enraged barbarian soldiers eventually decided to join Alaric in
39 Zos. 5.34.1. On Sarus’modus operandi in these critical years, seeWijnendaele (2019).
40 PLRE 1: “Stilicho,” 857.
41 Halsall (2007), 213 for a similar judgment, but with different emphasis. Blockley (1998), 125
and Williams and Friell (1994), 143 also point out that if Stilicho’s policies failed, Theodosius I
should share some responsibility since Stilicho had basically continued his.
42 PLRE 2: “Eucherius 1,” 405.
43 Contra Paschoud (1989), 246; Wolfram (1988), 154; Garnsey and Humfress (2001), 103; Ward-
Perkins (2005), 27; Salzman (2006), 367. Jones (1964), 185 even claims that “Roman troops, who
had long been jealous of the barbarian federates, now wreaked their spite upon them by massa-
cring their families.” See also the reservations of Börm (2013), 51.
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Noricum after receiving words of the massacre of their families.44 However,
Honorius’ court continued using some barbarian soldiers and officers even im-
mediately after Stilicho’s fall.45 The best explanation for the massacre of these
particular barbarians, therefore, is that they were singled out because of their
association with Stilicho, that is, that Olympius feared that someone among their
leaders would eventually seek to avenge the death of Stilicho, or that they would
be used by some other group for this purpose.46 It is worth highlighting this
connection further. The war with Radagaisus had raised Stilicho to the peak of his
military power.47 After his victories in Tuscany, Stilicho will have had thousands
of Gothic warriors who needed to be integrated in the western Roman military. As
Olympiodorus states: “The chiefs of the Goths who were with Radagaisus were
called optimates, and they were 12,000 in number. When he had defeated Rada-
gaisus, Stilicho made them his allies.”48 The rounded nature of the number
12,000 has caused it to be questioned by a few scholars.49 Indeed, it is unlikely
that 12,000 aristocrats were left after the defeat of Radagaisus, and this figure
probably refers to the better warriors more generally, including some noblemen
such as Sarus. However, the number seems reasonable in itself, given the size of
Radagaisus’ following as a whole, and these warriors were probably enlisted
amongst Stilicho’s forces, as implied above. He doubtless retained the best among
the forces closest to him. It is noteworthy here that Photius’ epitome of Olympio-
dorus’ history sets its information concerning the reception of these Gothic
warriors into the Roman army between two digressions on the foederati and
buccellarii.50 It seems probable, therefore, that Stilicho recruited the best of
44 Zos. 5.35.6 claims that 30,000 barbarians joined Alaric in Noricum but this number is suspect.
See Ridley (1982), 219 n. 129; Burns (1994), 234.
45 Officers: Generidus (PLRE 2: 500–501), Allobichus (PLRE 2: 61). Olympius commanded 300
Huns against Athaulf in 409 (Zos. 5.45.6) and Honorius supposedly issued orders to the Dalmatian
administration that they had to prepare provisions for an army of allegedly 10,000 Huns (Zos.
5.50.1).
46 See Cameron and Long (1993), 333 and Lee (2013a), 91–93 for a similar judgment on the Gothic
“pogroms” of 400 at Constantinople, that these were directed specifically against Gainas’ suppor-
ters, not Goths in general.
47 Wolfram (1997), 161.
48 Olympiod. Fr. 9 (tr. Blockley 1983): Ὅτι τῶν μετὰ Ῥοδογάΐσον Γότθων οἱ κεφαλαιῶται
ὀπτίματοι ἐκαλοῦντο, εἰς δώδεκα συντείνοντες χιλιάδας, οὕς καταπολεμήσας Στελίχων Ῥοδογάΐ-
σον προσηταιρίσατο.
49 Matthews (1975), 274 n. 6; Drinkwater (1998), 273 n. 23. The number is accepted by the
communis opinio however: Heather (1995), 12; Elton (2007), 299; Halsall (2007) 207; Stickler
(2007), 506; Fear (2010), 399 n. 448; Sarris (2011), 49; Mitchell (2015), 98.
50 Olympiod. Fr. 7.4; 12. On the nature and development of the buccellarii, see Schmitt (1994);
Lenski (2009); Wijnendaele (forthcoming b).
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Radagaisus’ former warriors among his own buccellarii.51 As subsequent events
were to show, Stilicho’s use of these defeated barbarians was a major departure
from previous imperial policy.
Throughout the third and fourth century, the imperial government favoured
breaking up defeated war-bands into smaller units and settling them in areas
scattered across the empire.52 Consequentially, this would help breaking down
previous ethnic ties and thus help assimilating these warriors in the Roman
military and ensure their allegiance to the state. Instead, Stilicho did not disperse
these men but kept most—if not all—of Radagaisus’ defeated armies close to him
in Italy.53 Prior to their invasion these men would have come from a tradition of
fighting in war-bands and owing allegiance to a lord, in this case Radagaisus.54
Loyalty to a state such as the Roman Empire may have been an abstract concept
to many of them. Olympiodorus’ language could be interpreted as Stilicho actu-
ally replacing Radagaisus’ position and thus allowing them to continue their
tradition of allegiance to an individual. This enabled Stilicho to expand the
number of retainers in his service, so that he now controlled an army within an
army. This should not necessarily be seen as some sinister scheme on Stilicho’s
part, but simply as a short-term measure given his previous difficulties in muster-
51 It should also be observed here that, as earlier mentioned, Stilicho had kept a Hunnic body-
guard until his downfall. Most probably, these had also been recruited after his victory over
Radagaisus, for which he had originally contracted the services of the Hunnic chieftain Uldin: see
Wijnendaele (2016a), 275–276.
52 On this policy, see: Burns (1994), 1–23; Lee (2007), 81–85. This is particularly well attested in
the successful integration of the former Alamanni leaders Vadomarius (PLRE 1: “Vadomarius,”
928) and Fraomarius (PLRE 1: “Fraomarius,” 372) as imperial commanders, yet stationed as far
away as respectively the Levant and Britain.
53 This can be inferred from their role in the events surrounding Stilicho’s downfall in Italy, the
persecutions Honorius’ government subsequently enacted against them, and their flight en masse
to Alaric in nearby Noricum. One may note that the identification of Stilicho’s auxiliaries fleeing
to Alaric as former warriors of Radagaisus, is one of the rare cares where the otherwise diame-
trically opposed Heather (1996) 146–151 and Kulikowski (2019) 79 n. 20 are in agreement. For an
alternative interpretation, see Gheller (2017), 65–66.
54 The nature of barbarian leadership prior to the migration era is still a vexed topic: see Halsall
(2007), 121–125. An important question, which cannot be investigated further since it would vastly
exceed the scope of the current research, is how different the barbarian kings of the fifth-century
groups were to those emerging warlord-commanders in the western imperial army (on the latter
see Wijnendaele 2016 b; 2018). One useful angle, followed by Halsall (2007) and Kulikowski (2012)
is to see “kingship” as an Ersatz for those barbarian leaders working within the empire but
excluded from the imperial high command. For further discussion on barbarian leadership, see
the various studies in Pohl (1998) and Gillett (2002).
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ing manpower. The potential danger of this practice, as future events would
show, is that these men kept a sense of their worth and power.
V Conclusion
In his seminal work on Stilicho, Santo Mazzarino once stated that in surprisingly
quick fashion Stilicho had gone “dagli altari alla polvere.”55 By the start of the
summer of 408, Stilicho may have reasonably judged that he had militarily every-
thing under control. Certainly, Constantine III had been punching above his
weight when he tried to establish himself in the Transalpine provinces with the
very last comitatenses of Britain. He already had his hands full with the dual
challenge of pinning down the barbarian war-bands who had crossed the Rhine
in northern Gaul, and the Theodosian resistance in the Iberian peninsula.56 If the
Ticinum campaign had ever launched, backed with Alaric’s auxiliary army, there
seems little doubt that it would have been Constantine’s head rolling from the
executioner’s block in 408. At the same time, enough resources were at hand for
Stilicho to simultaneously pursue his highly ambitious plans to have his say in
the imperial succession at the eastern court. Yet what finally brought the western
generalissimo down was not military strategy but a thorough underestimation
how much the western nobility took umbrage over his tactics in accomplishing
this goal.57 Stilicho basically squandered the political capital he had carefully
accumulated over more than a decade by pushing through an overambitious
agenda while ignoring the sensitivities of his “constituency.”
The most enduring charge against Stilicho was not his adfectatio regni but
that he could never entirely dissociate himself from his barbarian auxiliaries.58
The enigmatic creator of the Historia Augusta, who may have been a contempor-
ary of Stilicho, had already remarked that “the aid that Romans received from
barbarian auxiliaries must be felt not seen” (sentiendum esse non videndum cum
auxiliaribus barbaris Romanus iuvatur).59 While one may earnestly doubt the
55 Mazzarino (1942), 310.
56 Kulikowski (2000), 332–336.
57 For a comparable verdict but with different highlighting, Kulikowski (2013), 79. Elton (2012),
657 also remarks that “Jerome’s panic (from Palestine) about the 406 invaders was probably quite
different from Stilicho’s response since both had different expectations.”
58 CTh. 9.42.22; Oros. 7.38.3–7; Rut. De Red. 3.49–50; Chron. Gall. 452, 55; Marcell. Com. s.a. 408
(1); Jord.Get. 115.
59 V.Prob. 14.7. For the latest status quaestionis on the Historia Augusta, see Cameron (2011),
743–782.
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validity of this pastiche as a source for historical inquiry regarding its Kaiser-
geschichte, the sentiment it reveals in this passage would have resonated loudly
with the landed aristocracy of Italy. To fully appreciate the dénouement of the
events of 408, we have to retrace our steps to Stilicho’s victory over Radagaisus in
406 and its reverberations the following years. Thousands of Gothic warriors
remained close together in an imperial province, this time the political heartland
of the imperial west. The dual nature of these warriors as imperial troops, but
personally bound to Stilicho, meant that he could exploit them to serve his needs
first and only secondarily those of the state. In this way, while Radagaisus’
invasion initially posed an external threat, it soon had important consequences
for the development of the western Roman army, resulting in the emergence of an
internal threat also in due course. This mass influx of Gothic retainers would play
a destabilizing role in subsequent political events, especially when they were
used as semi‑private powerbases for ambitious individuals such as Alaric, Athaulf
or Sarus, ultimately culminating in the sack of Rome in 410. Orosius’ dictum on
Radagaisus’ defeat as a triumph and tragedy certainly rings true for Stilicho
himself: “we won the battle, but were vanquished in our victory” (Oros. 7.37.2:
pugnantes uicimus, uictores uicti sumus).
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